From Global Data Corridor to Control Gateways: A Reading into Egypt’s Digital Infrastructure

Introduction

Amid the growing global reliance on digital networks as a key driver of the economy, communication, and services, a country’s telecommunications infrastructure has become a measure of its technological capabilities and its position within the international connectivity map. This infrastructure is no longer limited to physical components such as cables and exchanges; it now reflects the state’s approach to regulation, distribution, and development, as well as its commitment to equal opportunities in accessing digital resources.

In Egypt, this reality manifests in a complex manner. While the country enjoys a geographic location that makes it a key corridor for data traffic between continents, this geographic advantage does not necessarily translate into service quality or equitable domestic distribution. Clear gaps emerge between what is technically available and what actually reaches users in terms of speed, reliability, cost, and the protection of personal data.

This disparity is linked to infrastructure but also extends to the management patterns and public policies governing this sector. The way digital resources are handled, the extent to which information is made available, and the mechanisms of accountability all shape the contours of the digital environment in which citizens live on a daily basis. From this perspective, analyzing this infrastructure becomes essential—not only as a system for digital transmission, but as a governing framework that influences opportunities, rights, participation, and empowerment.

This paper examines the various aspects of Egypt’s digital infrastructure, beginning with its position within the global internet ecosystem, moving through patterns of ownership and governance, and culminating in the levels of access, service quality, and legal safeguards available to protect digital rights. Rather than merely describing the challenges, the paper seeks to present a critical yet balanced vision for potential reform pathways—one that places user interests at the heart of digital governance and promotes a model that is fairer, more transparent, and more sustainable.

The Role of Submarine Cables in the Global Internet and Egypt’s Strategic Position

Submarine cables play a fundamental and pivotal role in the global Internet system, serving as the primary means of transmitting more than 95% of international data traffic between continents These cables represent the invisible yet essential pillars of digital infrastructure, connecting national networks worldwide to the global internet.

Within this system, Egypt enjoys an exceptional geostrategic position, serving as a central link between Asia and Europe via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. According to official statements published in June 2025, Egypt hosts 20 international submarine cables, including both operational and under-construction lines. This concentration enhances Egypt’s importance as a global digital corridor and reflects the growing investments in this strategic sector.

The submarine cable map clearly shows a significant concentration of cables in Egypt. These cables enter from the Red Sea through the city of Suez, then traverse approximately 160 kilometers over land before exiting into the Mediterranean Sea along the northern coast. In practical terms, Egypt serves as a vital corridor through which a substantial share of global internet traffic between Asia and Europe passes—estimated by some sources at over 90%. This makes Egypt a digital chokepoint, a critical juncture on which data flows between entire continents depend.

This geographical concentration has no easy alternatives, stemming from several interrelated factors including:

1. Geographic factor: The route through Egypt offers the shortest sea–land corridor between Asia and Europe compared to alternative paths, such as the Cape of Good Hope in the south or the polar routes in the north.
2. Geopolitical factors: Alternative land routes pass through unstable or sanctioned regions, such as Syria, Iraq, and Iran, making them unfavorable for international telecommunications companies.
3. Failure of Alternative Attempts: Alternative projects, such as the JADI cable (via Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey) or the EPEG project (via Iran and Russia), have failed to provide an effective substitute due to political tensions and high costs.
4. Market dynamics: Over time, the Egyptian route has become the default choice for most global companies, creating economies of scale that have reduced relative costs and increased reliance on it.

However, this concentration carries significant risks. From a technical perspective, any malfunction or damage to Egypt’s submarine cables could cause widespread disruption in connectivity between East and West. The Red Sea itself is relatively shallow, making it particularly vulnerable to cable-cutting incidents. Actual cases have occurred, such as the 2013 cable disruption near Alexandria due to attempted theft or sabotage. At that time, the Egyptian Navy even apprehended individuals attempting to sever an undersea cable. Such incidents highlight the fragility of relying on a single pathway. A European Union report has warned that Egypt’s cable corridor represents “the most critical bottleneck” for Europe’s digital connectivity with Asia, constituting a vulnerability that requires enhanced security measures.

From a commercial perspective, international telecom companies have found themselves compelled to deal with a de facto monopoly held by Telecom Egypt over the transit route – accompanied by the high transit fees imposed by Egypt. Some network operators have complained about these fees, describing them as “exorbitant,” yet they remain obliged to pay due to the lack of viable alternatives.

Nevertheless, major tech powers have begun exploring solutions to reduce their reliance on the Egyptian route, despite the challenges involved. For example, Google announced its “Blue-Raman” submarine cable project, which connects India to Europe via the Red Sea but deliberately bypasses Egypt. Instead, the cable exits through Israel to the Mediterranean.

This project sets a precedent that could encourage the routing of additional cables through alternative paths bypassing Egyptian territory if proven successful. These developments indicate that Egypt’s role as a critically important digital corridor may face future competition unless it moves swiftly to enhance its competitiveness. Estimates already point to growing competition from alternative routes in countries such as Morocco (westward toward Europe) and Israel (eastern Mediterranean).

Ownership of Submarine Cables Passing Through Egypt and the Level of Transparency

Submarine cables run through Egyptian territory and waters, but who actually owns and controls them?

Internationally, most major submarine cables are owned by alliances of global telecommunications companies that share capacity among themselves. However, passage through Egypt requires special arrangements due to sovereignty considerations; no international cable can cross Egyptian land without a local partnership. In this context, Telecom Egypt (WE) has emerged as the dominant player: it is not only the national telecommunications company owning most of the terrestrial infrastructure, but also the mandatory local partner for any cable linking the Red Sea to the Mediterranean through Egypt.

Historically, Telecom Egypt (WE) has maintained a monopolistic position in Egypt’s telecommunications infrastructure sector, largely due to its exclusive rights under Law No. 10 of 2003 regulating telecommunications. The law granted Telecom Egypt exclusive rights to build and operate the country’s core telecommunications infrastructure. As a result, other companies (such as Vodafone, Orange, and Etisalat) have been compelled to lease capacity from Telecom Egypt rather than build parallel international networks. This effectively places sole responsibility for improving international internet connectivity on Telecom Egypt.

On the level of control and management, the keys to international internet gateways remain concentrated in the hands of the Egyptian state, which maintains near-complete dominance over digital infrastructure through Telecom Egypt. Although the state’s share in the company was reduced from 80% to approximately 67.5% after floating a portion of shares on the stock exchange in 2023, the Egyptian government – represented by the Ministry of Finance – still holds the majority stake and maintains effective control over the company’s policies and strategic directions.

The company’s board of directors largely operates in close coordination with sovereign entities, making it an executive tool of the state’s digital policies rather than merely a commercial enterprise. The state has reinforced its institutional grip in recent years through formal measures, most notably Cabinet Decision No. 242 of 2019, which transferred ownership of telecommunications infrastructure assets—including fiber-optic cables—to the Armed Forces’ National Service Projects Organization (NSPO).

This extreme concentration of ownership and management turns the infrastructure into a closed black box, inaccessible to civil and societal oversight. It also limits the possibilities for auditing and accountability, and raises fundamental questions about the transparency of digital governance and the neutrality of infrastructure amid the growing role of the state’s security apparatus in the telecommunications sector.

In practice, transparency is nearly absent in the management of the international cable sector. No public information is available regarding contracts for cable transit or the associated fees, while most operational details of the networks are classified as national security secrets. Even public discussion of the issue in the media faces restrictions. For example, in 2019, a television presenter criticized what he considered to be corruption in the fees for submarine cable transit and excessive profiteering that threatened Egypt’s position as a digital corridor. The response was swift: his program was suspended and the channel was fined.

From the preceding discussion, it becomes evident that the state, through its affiliated companies, effectively monopolizes the management of submarine cables and digital infrastructure. This monopoly has granted it tremendous control over information flows while simultaneously providing substantial treasury revenue through transit fees. However, it has also resulted in a conspicuous absence of transparency, weak competition, and stifled innovation. As long as no genuine competitor exists in building and operating core infrastructure, decision-making remains confined to a narrow circle. This concentration of power risks prioritizing quick profits or narrow security interests at the expense of the broader interests of internet users and comprehensive digital development.

Fair Access

Despite the abundance of international cables passing through Egypt and the enormous capacities they provide, Egyptian users still suffer from problems related to service quality, cost, and uneven availability from one region to another. In other words, the digital wealth flowing through the country does not automatically translate into better internet service for citizens. On the contrary, indicators reveal clear digital divides with geographical and social dimensions.

Geographically, access to high-speed internet in Egypt remains characterized by clear urban concentration, with major cities capturing the lion’s share of telecommunications infrastructure and fixed internet services. According to data from the Ministry of Communications, the number of fixed broadband subscriptions in Egypt reached approximately 11.67 million by the end of January 2025, compared to 11.63 million subscriptions in December 2024, reflecting a monthly increase of about 40,000 subscriptions.

The data reveals that Greater Cairo and the urban Nile Delta regions dominate the landscape, each accounting for 35% of subscriptions. In contrast, the remaining subscriptions are distributed as follows: tribal areas at 15%, followed by Alexandria and Matrouh at 9%, with canal cities, Sinai, and the Red Sea region trailing at just 6%. This uneven distribution clearly demonstrates that urban center residents enjoy the lion’s share of internet services, while rural and desert areas suffer from delayed access and inadequate infrastructure.

Service quality

In terms of service quality and cost, although internet speeds in Egypt have improved in recent years, they remain low compared to global and regional averages. The average speed rose from 5.4 Mbps in December 2017 to 80.3 Mbps in January 2025, thanks to investments exceeding $3.5 billion in developing digital infrastructure.

In April 2025, the average speed reached 85.64 Mbps, raising Egypt’s ranking to 71st globally in fixed internet speed, while maintaining its position as the top country in Africa for the third consecutive year. Despite this progress, Egypt still lags behind some regional countries, where average speeds in the UAE, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia exceed 200 Mbps, indicating the need for further investments and expansions in infrastructure.

In terms of access capacity to the global internet, figures show that the share of international connection speed available to the Egyptian user has improved over recent years. While this share did not exceed 9 kilobits per second in 2016, it has now risen to about 17 kilobits per second per user.

However, despite this improvement, Egypt still lags far behind the global average, which exceeds 150 kilobits per second per person. This means that each user in Egypt receives a much smaller “share” of international internet speed compared to users in other countries. This affects connection quality, particularly when downloading content, watching videos, or making calls over the internet. It also underscores the need to increase Egypt’s international bandwidth in order to keep pace with the growing demand for internet access.

Service Fees

The pricing of home internet packages in Egypt has witnessed consecutive increases during 2024 and 2025. Companies justified these hikes with factors such as inflation, network upgrades, and rising operating costs. However, these increases have placed a heavy burden on users, especially in light of the difficult economic conditions.

In addition, internet packages in Egypt remain constrained by data caps, where once the allocated gigabytes are consumed, speeds drop significantly or connectivity is cut off—adding to users’ frustrations. Despite ongoing calls for the provision of unlimited internet, companies have not responded to these demands.

All this is happening at a time when the state is moving toward digital transformation, with many government services now dependent on the internet. This raises questions about the ability of citizens, especially those with limited income, to keep up with this shift. The issue is not limited to rising prices, but also extends to the curtailment of citizens’ rights to access a service that has become a necessity of daily life.

The negative impact of this unequal distribution manifests in certain segments and groups of society remaining digitally marginalized. For instance, a citizen in a remote village in Upper Egypt does not have the same access to online information, educational services, or job opportunities compared to a citizen in Cairo. This digital discrimination deepens social and economic disparities, as specific regions are deprived of the benefits of digital development. Moreover, poor connection quality or relatively high prices for low-income individuals effectively restrict their ability to utilize the internet as a platform for expression, communication, and knowledge.

Infrastructure between Censorship and Espionage

The state’s centralized control over internet gateways serves as a tool for national cybersecurity protection, yet it simultaneously enables widespread surveillance practices that may violate citizens’ digital rights and threaten their privacy. In Egypt, evidence indicates that telecommunications infrastructure has indeed been leveraged as a key instrument for online censorship and control, often conflicting with the right to privacy and freedom of expression.

Since the Mubarak era, Egyptian security agencies have systematically resorted to monitoring communications and internet activities. These practices escalated significantly following the January 2011 revolution. Human rights experts unanimously confirm that Egyptian security agencies actively conduct mass surveillance of all forms of communication, with particular focus on intensive targeting of activists and political opponents.

While Article 57 of the Egyptian Constitution explicitly guarantees communication confidentiality and prohibits surveillance without a justified judicial order for a limited duration, reality has witnessed systematic violations of this constitutional principle, whether through legislation or actual practice.

The Egyptian state leverages its control over critical internet infrastructure to conduct sophisticated surveillance operations. In 2018, investigations by Citizen Lab revealed that Egyptian authorities were employing Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technology to intercept user communications and reroute them for malicious purposes.

The investigation revealed that these devices were discovered at a control point belonging to Telecom Egypt, where they were used to intercept users’ unencrypted web browsing traffic on a large scale. The investigation showed that this technology was being used to redirect users either to advertising content that generated profits or to cryptocurrency mining software, in a covert operation that researchers dubbed “AdHose.”

This system operates in two modes: a “spray” mode that forces ads onto a large number of users for short periods, and a “trickle” mode that targets specific resources (such as JavaScript libraries and inactive websites) to covertly inject ads. Technical evidence indicates these practices were carried out using Sandvine’s devices supplied to service providers under the name (PacketLogic). Using network equipment in this manner for profit and to download software onto users’ devices without their knowledge constitutes a blatant violation of their privacy and digital rights.

In addition to interception and ad injection tactics, the infrastructure has also been utilized for website blocking and content monitoring. Since 2017, authorities have launched an extensive campaign to block hundreds of news websites, human rights platforms, and blogs classified as oppositional.

The number of blocked websites in Egypt has reached at least 600. The blocking was technically implemented through directives from security agencies to internet service providers, ordering them to disable access to specific domains and IP addresses at the network gateway level. In most cases, this blocking occurred without any judicial order or official announcement, leaving those affected by the blocking with no legal recourse to challenge it.

The blocked websites included independent news platforms (such as Mada Masr and Al-Manassa), websites of international organizations (such as Human Rights Watch and Reporters without Borders), and even censorship circumvention tools (such as VPN websites, the Tor network, and others). It is also worth noting that the authorities blocked secure communication applications; for example, in late 2016, the encrypted Signal application was completely blocked for a period of time, in the first known instance of a communication app being blocked in Egypt.

On the level of surveillance and individual targeting, security agencies have exploited the centralized infrastructure to conduct direct interception operations. All service providers are legally obligated to provide all technical capabilities that enable security apparatuses to access communications. Reports have revealed that Egyptian authorities have used sophisticated spyware, such as FinFisher and Predator, to target the phones of political activists in recent years.

The Legal Framework Governing Digital Infrastructure and Digital Rights Safeguards

The legislative and regulatory framework serves as the foundation that determines how digital infrastructure is managed and the scope of the state’s role in it. In Egypt, a review of relevant legislation reveals a tendency to empower executive and security authorities with near-absolute control over the communications sector, while providing legal cover for many restrictive measures. Although constitutional provisions enshrine digital rights, subsequent laws contain vague clauses that allow for the violation of these rights under the pretexts of security and public order.

The 2014 Egyptian Constitution includes explicit provisions safeguarding the right to privacy and freedom of communication. Article 57 clearly states: “The private life of citizens is inviolable and protected by law. The confidentiality of postal, electronic, telephonic correspondence and other means of communication is safeguarded. Such correspondence may not be confiscated, accessed, or monitored except by a justified judicial order for a specified period and in cases defined by law.”

The same article further stipulates: “The state is committed to protecting citizens’ right to use public means of communication and to not arbitrarily suspend or cut them off.” In addition, Article 99 stipulates that any violation of personal freedom or the sanctity of private life is a crime that is not subject to a statute of limitations. These provisions create a theoretical framework for safeguarding digital rights; however, their practical value remains contingent on the extent to which the state adheres to the legislation and implements executive measures that bring these safeguards into effect in reality.

The Telecommunications Regulation Law constitutes the primary legislative framework governing the telecommunications sector in Egypt. The law was issued in a timeframe that predates the proliferation of social media and smartphones, which was reflected in its nature and content, granting the authorities broad powers to regulate and monitor the sector.

For example, Article 64 of the law requires telecommunications service providers to “make available all technical capabilities, including equipment, systems, and software, that enable the competent security authorities to carry out their duties in accordance with the law.” This provision obliges telecom companies to fully cooperate with the Armed Forces and the National Security Agency in granting access to monitor networks, and it prohibits the use of encryption tools without the approval of the competent authorities—effectively criminalizing individuals’ attempts to secure their communications through modern encryption technologies.

Article 67 also grants authorities the right to take control of any telecommunications operator’s networks and services and place them entirely at the state’s disposal in cases of emergency or national security. It is evident from these two articles that the law has handed the state the “on/off switch” for the network in one hand and the “content access key” in the other. From this perspective, it becomes clear how the authorities were able to completely shut down internet services during the 2011 revolution or carry out widespread surveillance of digital communications under this legal framework.

Rather than limiting these broad powers, in recent years the state has moved to tighten its grip on the digital space through new legislation. Among the most notable of these laws is the Cybercrime Law No. 175 of 2018.

This law—drafted in broad and vague language—allows the blocking of websites by administrative order without a judicial ruling in cases involving a “threat to national security or the economy.” It also compels service providers to comply with blocking orders immediately, under penalty of imprisonment and fines.

The law also includes provisions requiring service providers to retain users’ activity data for specified periods and submit it to security agencies upon request. This effectively opens the door for large-scale government surveillance under the pretext of “combating cybercrimes.” Consequently, the law has legalized many practices that were already in place (such as blocking opposition websites), providing them with a legal cover.

In 2020, the Personal Data Protection Law was enacted, aiming to regulate data processing in the private sector and safeguard citizens’ data privacy within companies. While the introduction of this law is considered a positive step toward aligning legislation with international standards, it included broad exemptions that allow security and sovereign entities to bypass restrictions on data collection and processing.

Surveillance powers expanded further in early 2025, when Parliament enacted the new Criminal Procedure Law. Article no. 79 of the law grants the Public Prosecution the authority to monitor and intercept communications “for an indefinite period” without requiring a separate judicial warrant.

This article was met with sharp criticism from legal experts and privacy advocates, as it transformed what was meant to be an exception—surveillance by judicial order for a limited period—into the general rule, granting the Public Prosecution virtually unlimited authority. Human rights defenders argued that, instead of ending violations, the authorities were entrenching them, effectively legalizing and providing cover for security agencies to continue their practices.

Conversely, Egyptian legislation lacks sufficient safeguards and restrictions to protect digital rights. For example, there is no freedom of information law to ensure transparency, nor is there an independent body to oversee the legality of surveillance and wiretapping operations. Moreover, existing penalties for violations, if any, are rarely enforced.

At the international level, Egypt is a party to binding treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantees the right to privacy and freedom of expression. It has also voted in favor of UN resolutions condemning digital rights violations. However, at the domestic level, exceptional local laws often take precedence over these obligations. For example, the United Nations has explicitly stated that cutting off internet access can never be justified under international human rights law, and that states must maintain network access even during periods of unrest.

In sum, the current Egyptian legal framework has granted the authorities virtually unchecked legal tools to control the digital infrastructure under the pretext of security and public order, without establishing corresponding safeguards to protect citizens’ digital rights.

Conclusion

Digital infrastructure constitutes a fundamental pillar for ensuring the exercise of human rights in the modern era, as its use intersects with the rights to education, health, expression, privacy, and participation in public affairs. In Egypt, a genuine digital transformation cannot be realized without addressing the disparities and gaps that prevent all citizens, without discrimination, from enjoying digital rights on an equal footing.

Ensuring digital equity is not a developmental luxury but a fundamental rights-based obligation. Internet access, the protection of personal data, and freedom of expression through digital media are natural extensions of the basic rights and freedoms guaranteed by international conventions and the Egyptian Constitution itself. From this perspective, reforming the policies and governance structures of the digital space must be guided by a rights-based approach rather than a logic of control.