Introduction
During the drafting phase of the 2014 constitution, extensive debate emerged regarding the necessity to establish a unified legislative framework regulating all forms of media. This vision ultimately materialized through the law regulating the press and media. The enactment of this law and its subsequent executive regulations – particularly the Licensing and Penalties bylaws – brought about a radical transformation in the licensing of websites in Egypt.
However, the law was not limited to regulating the establishment and operation of traditional media outlets. Rather, it expanded to encompass all forms of websites, including those affiliated with commercial entities, unions, associations, and clubs. This represented a fundamental shift toward using legal regulation as a tool for monitoring various forms of digital expression.
This unprecedented expansion granted the Supreme Council for Media Regulation (SCMR) the authority to license these websites and, consequently, monitor their published content. Furthermore, the Council sought to impose regulatory rules on personal social media accounts with over five thousand followers, marking a clear extension of censorship logic into the private sphere and personal expression.
This legislative reality translates, in practical terms, into an expanding scope of prosecutions related to operating websites without obtaining the required licenses. This trend raises significant legal and human rights concerns regarding both the legitimacy of such charges and the legal basis upon which they rest.
In this context, this paper seeks to monitor the legal and regulatory transformations that have taken place since the adoption of the 2014 constitution through the issuance of the Press and Media Regulation Law in 2018, while evaluating the current landscape after approximately seven years of the law’s implementation. Furthermore, the paper aims to analyze the legislative impact of applying the law’s provisions within Egyptian courtrooms by examining the precision of its legal formulations and documenting its tangible effects on digital freedom of expression and the operational environment for various types of websites.
First: The Constitutional Framework Governing the Operation of Websites
The Egyptian Constitution issued in 2014 did not contain independent provisions directly regulating the operation of websites in Egypt. It neither mandated legislation to define the controls and conditions for their operation, nor specified the competent authorities responsible for their oversight. Furthermore, it failed to provide special legal safeguards to protect their freedom and independence.
However, the Constitution did incorporate certain regulatory and protective aspects concerning the operation of websites through their intersection with several fundamental rights and freedoms. Specifically, it affirmed the state’s obligation to protect citizens’ right to use all forms of public communication means, prohibiting their arbitrary disruption, suspension, or denial to citizens. Moreover, it guaranteed other rights directly relevant to website operations – such as freedom of expression, the right to access information, and various other rights enumerated under the chapter on Rights and Freedoms.
However, the Constitution specifically addressed websites operating in the journalism and media field, referring to them as “electronic newspapers.” It established several regulations concerning the right to own and operate media outlets, including digital press, while simultaneously emphasizing the protection of their freedom.
In this context, the constitutional legislator differentiated between the degrees of freedom in establishing media outlets. It stipulated that print newspapers could be established and published through a simple notification procedure; it deferred the regulation of electronic newspapers to a special legal framework requiring licensing. Similarly, it referred all regulatory aspects concerning the ownership and management of electronic newspapers to the law.
Subsequently, the 2018 Press and Media Regulation Law was enacted, granting the Supreme Council for Media Regulation (SCMR) expansive powers that included issuing licenses for all types of websites operating in Egypt—not just journalistic ones. This expansion represents an overreach of the constitutional legislator’s original intent, necessitating a re-examination of the 2014 constitution-drafting committee’s (the Committee of Fifty) deliberations to understand the constitutional provisions’ original purposes and the limits of regulatory authority delegated to the law.
The proposal submitted by the Journalists’ Syndicate for Article 70 contained the following text:
“Freedom of the press and freedom of printing, publishing, and circulation in print, visual, audio, and electronic forms are guaranteed. Egyptians, whether natural or legal persons, public or private, have the right to own and issue newspapers and establish visual and audio media outlets, as well as digital media documents. Newspapers shall be published upon mere notification as regulated by law. The law shall regulate the procedures for establishing and owning radio and television broadcasting stations and electronic newspapers.”
The final approved and enacted version reads as follows:
Article 70: “Freedom of the press, printing, and publishing—in print, visual, audio, and electronic forms—is guaranteed. Egyptians, whether natural or legal persons, public or private entities, have the right to own and publish newspapers and establish visual, audio, and digital media platforms. Newspapers may be published through a notification procedure as regulated by law. The law shall regulate the establishment and ownership of radio and television broadcast stations and electronic newspapers.”
The deliberations of the Committee of Fifty during the drafting of this article revealed a clear focus on regulatory aspects specifically concerning “electronic newspapers,” with no reference whatsoever to non-journalistic websites. In fact, the committee explicitly debated and affirmed that social media pages should not be subject to any regulatory rules.
Diaa Rashwan, then-President of the Journalists’ Syndicate and the Syndicate’s representative of the Committee, emphasized that the article addressed two key aspects. The first concerned freedom of the press and publishing in all its forms, including digital media – which should not be subject to direct legal regulation, as is the case with social media pages, given the difficulty, indeed near impossibility, of regulating them. The second aspect related to the publication of print newspapers through a notification procedure, while audiovisual media and electronic newspapers would be subject to special regulatory measures due to their distinct technical and technological nature.
From the above, it becomes clear that the constitutional legislator did not establish explicit regulatory or protective rules for non-journalistic websites. This omission subsequently enabled parliamentary legislators to expansively regulate such sites under the umbrella of “electronic newspapers” without clear constitutional justification. Consequently, these websites were stripped of any safeguards against executive or administrative interference, constituting a direct infringement on digital freedom of expression and the autonomy of cyberspace.
Second: The Problematic Mandate for All Websites Operating in Egypt to Obtain Licenses
Prior to the enactment of the 2018 Press and Media Regulation Law, there was no binding legal framework regulating the operation of websites in general. Many website operators simply obtained a registration and deposit certificate from the Intellectual Property Rights Protection Office affiliated with the Information Technology Industry Development Agency, or a certificate for the use of artistic works issued by the General Administration of Technical Licenses at Egypt’s Ministry of Culture.
The enactment of the law marked a pivotal turning point by exclusively vesting the Supreme Council for Media Regulation (SCMR) with the authority to license all websites operating in Egypt. The law employed broad phrasing that, at first glance, suggests that all websites operating within Egypt—regardless of the nature of their activity—are required to obtain a license from the Council in order to carry out their operations.
However, a careful reading of the law’s provisions and their analysis in light of constitutional principles leads to a different conclusion. The ambiguity surrounding the legal status of websites stems primarily from Article no. 6 of the law, which states:
“It is prohibited to establish or operate websites within the Arab Republic of Egypt, or to manage offices/branches of websites operating from outside the Republic, without obtaining a license from the Supreme Council for Media Regulation pursuant to the controls and conditions it establishes. Without prejudice to applicable criminal penalties, the Supreme Council may—in cases violating the above provision—take necessary measures including license revocation, suspension of website activity, or blocking, where no valid license exists. Affected parties may appeal such decisions before the Administrative Judiciary Court.”
The licensing application forms published on the official website of the Supreme Council for Media Regulation have contributed to deepening the state of ambiguity. Nine different models were published for licensing various types of websites. These included forms for websites affiliated with the National Media Authority, websites holding foreign licenses, and websites owned by individuals or companies. They also covered websites belonging to public legal entities, as well as scientific, research, and cultural bodies, along with those affiliated with political parties, unions, associations, federations, or clubs. Additionally, the forms included one for a website holding a foreign license and another for a site providing real-time news services to newspapers or media outlets.
It is evident from these forms that the Council has expanded the scope of licensing requirements to cover a wide range of websites, including those that do not engage in journalistic or media activities—an expansion that is not legally justified.
However, analyzing Article no. 6 in light of the definitions provided by the law leads to a different interpretation. The law defines a website as: “a licensed electronic page, link, or application through which journalistic, media, or advertising content is presented—whether textual, audio, visual (static or dynamic), or multimedia—published under a specific name, with a defined electronic address and domain, created, hosted, or accessed via the international information network (the Internet).”
The law also defines electronic commercial media or advertising services as: “Content that includes the promotion of businesses, services, products, or individuals through the Internet.”
Thus, it becomes clear that the law’s jurisdiction is limited to websites providing journalistic, media, or advertising content, and does not extend to non-media websites – such as commercial company sites, trade unions, associations, or clubs – which were included in the licensing forms without explicit legal basis in the statute itself.
This interpretation is further supported by the functional nature of the Supreme Council for Media Regulation, whose powers are defined in Article no. 70 of the law within 24 provisions, most of which focus on regulating press, audiovisual, and digital media outlets. None of these provisions address non-media websites, except for a single clause related to setting rules for collecting taxes on advertisements published on websites, blogs, and social media accounts.
Article no. 70 of the law stipulates that the Supreme Media Regulatory Council (SMRC) shall exercise its competencies to achieve its objectives, the most prominent of which include licensing media outlets, newspapers, channels, and media platforms. Additionally, it entails establishing professional and ethical standards, monitoring funding sources, reviewing advertising content, setting rules for dealing with foreign correspondents, and examining complaints while taking appropriate actions regarding them. A comprehensive review of these competencies reveals that the law grants the Council a regulatory role strictly limited to media and journalistic activities, with only a narrow exception pertaining to advertisements on digital platforms.
Consequently, the Supreme Council for Media Regulation’s expansion in imposing licensing requirements on non-press or non-media websites has no constitutional or legal basis and constitutes an overreach of its mandate, posing a threat to freedom of expression and the right to digital communication beyond the traditional press framework.
Third: Websites Explicitly Exempt from Licensing Requirements
The Law Regulating the Press and Media directly addressed the issue of subjecting what is referred to as “press and media entities, institutions, and electronic websites” to its provisions. It explicitly identifies certain categories that are exempt from its provisions, specifying these categories exhaustively. These are: the personal electronic website, the personal electronic medium, and the personal electronic account.
However, both the law and its executive regulations failed to provide clear definitions for these three exempted categories—a clear legislative flaw that has exacerbated confusion faced by law enforcement agencies and the Supreme Council for Media Regulation during implementation. While the law defined entities subject to its provisions, it did not offer precise definitions for the exempted categories, despite the fact that Egyptian legislation had never previously established clear definitions for terms such as “personal website,” “personal account,” or “personal electronic platform” before this law was enacted.
In an attempt to fill this gap, the Supreme Council for Media Regulation included some general definitions in the Licensing Regulations. A “personal website” was defined as a site created by an individual on the internet to display their résumé, interests, hobbies, or ideas. As for a “personal account,” it was defined as an electronic account on one of the websites used for the same purposes.
Nevertheless, the regulations did not include an explicit definition of the term “personal electronic medium,” though its meaning can be implicitly inferred by connecting the definitions of “personal account” and “social media sites”—the latter being defined in the regulations as “websites that enable users to exchange all forms of content via the internet.”
Despite these definitional attempts, addressing this shortcoming raises two fundamental issues. First, from a legal standpoint, it is impermissible to delegate the determination of a law’s scope of application—including which entities are subject to or exempt from it—to regulatory decisions issued by an administrative body such as the Supreme Council for Media Regulation. Second, the definitions provided in the regulations remain excessively broad and superficial, reflecting a lack of sufficient legislative effort. This confirms that these definitions were introduced merely to patch a flaw in the law’s original framework, rather than to establish a clear and precise scope of enforcement.
Moreover, the law has left a gray area between entities required to obtain licenses and those exempted from this obligation. There exists a wide spectrum of websites that do not fall under the classifications of journalistic, media, advertising, or personal—and thus find no clear place within the law’s framework. This gap creates a genuine legal dilemma, as regulatory laws, by their nature, are expected to be clear and precise, and to specify the entities subject to their provisions exhaustively, without expansion or analogy.
Consequently, any category not explicitly mentioned in the law’s provisions must be excluded from licensing requirements and should not be subjected to the associated penalties for non-compliance. This approach alone safeguards the principle of legal certainty and ensures that citizens’ digital freedoms remain protected beyond explicitly defined media frameworks.
Fourth: Conditions and Limitations for Establishing the Crime of Operating an Unlicensed Website
The crime of operating an unlicensed website, like other offenses, requires the fulfillment of specific conditions to be established. The absence of any of these conditions negates the crime. However, this assumption implicitly relies on the clarity of the crime, the definition of its elements, and the possibility of verifying that all such elements are present. Yet, in practice, since the issuance of the Law on the Regulation of the Press and Media, there has been no clear judicial jurisprudence interpreting the provisions of this law in general and in particular Articles no. 6 and 105, which relate to the crime of operating an unlicensed website.
In practice, individuals or legal entities are rarely charged solely with operating an unlicensed website as an independent offense. This charge is typically coupled with other accusations, such as operating a website for the purpose of committing a crime punishable by law — the offense stipulated in Article no. 27 of the Anti-Cybercrime Law — or charges of publishing false news, defamation, insult, and other offenses related to the published content.
It has been observed that courts tend, for the most part, to focus on the accompanying offenses, relying in their description and legal classification of the crime on the statement issued by the Supreme Council for Media Regulation, which indicates whether or not the website in question holds a license.
Building on this reality, this paper will conduct a direct analysis of Articles no. 6 and 105 of the Press and Media Regulation Law, with the aim of identifying the legal conditions necessary for the crime to be established, analyzing possible scenarios for its interpretation, and thereby determining the criteria that must be met for the crime to be legally constituted.
1-Requirements of Operating a website from within Egypt that constitute the crime of operating an unlicensed website
The condition that a website must be operated from within Egyptian territory is a fundamental element for establishing the crime of running an unlicensed website. However, the legal provisions governing the operation of websites — foremost among them the Law on the Regulation of the Press and Media and the Anti-Cybercrime Law — remain caught in a loop when it comes to the rules of territorial jurisdiction, namely the location where the crime is deemed to have been committed, when the medium used is a website or a social media account.
In this context, Article 6 of the Law on the Regulation of the Press and Media stipulates two main forms in which the crime of operating an unlicensed website may occur. The first is establishing or operating a website within the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the second is operating offices or branches for websites that operate from outside the country.
Although the legislator did not explicitly distinguish between the terms “establishment” and “operation,” it is implicitly understood that “establishment” refers to initiating the creation of a website even before it becomes operational. This interpretation unjustifiably expands the scope of criminalization, as the establishment or testing phase does not necessarily mean the site will actually launch. Moreover, requiring prior licensing before a website’s launch imposes an impractical burden on site owners—especially since obtaining a license requires specifying the site’s domain and address, meaning the site must physically exist before applying for licensing, creating a clear legislative contradiction.
Added to this problem is the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of “operation from within Egypt.” Does it refer to the location where the website is hosted (the servers), the legal headquarters of the entity responsible for operating it, or the location of the person or persons managing and monitoring the website’s content?
In one of its rulings, an Egyptian economic court attempted to interpret the concept of “operation from within Egypt.” In a case involving a woman accused of establishing and operating an unlicensed website and YouTube channel, the court referenced a technical report indicating that the site in question was hosted on servers located in Germany, and that its technical management was handled by another individual—who was neither charged nor brought to trial. Based on this, the court acquitted the defendant due to insufficient evidence proving her operation of the site, thereby negating one of the essential elements of the crime.
The court’s reasoning indicates that it prioritized both the website’s hosting location and the physical presence of its actual administrator, rather than relying solely on the Supreme Council for Media Regulation. Although the acquittal was not exclusively based on the “operation from within Egypt” element, the ruling stemmed from a fundamental legal principle: all statutory elements of the crime must be cumulatively satisfied—including the requirement of operation from Egyptian territory.
2-Criminal Liability for the “Actual Operation” of a Website
The crime of operating an unlicensed website—as defined under the Supreme Council for Media Regulation requires specific legal elements to be established. As previously noted, Article no. 6 of the Press and Media Regulation Law equates the terms “operation” and “establishment”. The term “operation” itself, however, has not been sufficiently clarified, even though it constitutes the core act that gives rise to criminal liability.
The absence of a precise legal definition for what constitutes “operation” raises fundamental questions: Does it refer to the liability of the legal entity (the juridical person) behind the website, or to the individuals actually managing the unlicensed site, or is responsibility to be jointly shared between the legal entity and the actual operator? This distinction is not merely a formal detail, but rather forms the foundational basis for determining the scope of criminal liability.
If we assume that the legislator intended “operation” to mean the legal responsibility of the legal entity, there are indications that support this interpretation. One of the most notable is the supplementary penalty stipulated in Article no. 105 of the law, which provides for “closure and confiscation of the equipment, devices, and components used in committing the crime.” By its nature, this penalty is directed at an entity that can actually be closed down — something difficult to envisage in the case of individuals.
Conversely, if we interpret “operation” to mean the actual supervision of a website’s functioning, then criminal liability would fall on the individuals responsible for its technical or editorial management. In this case, the law must clearly define the characteristics of such operational control so that the attribution of responsibility is not left to varying interpretations, preventing subjective and inconsistent attribution of responsibility.
For guidance and interpretation, we can reference the legislator’s approach in other laws, such as Article no. 65 bis of the Capital Market Law, which criminalizes the delayed submission of financial statements to the General Authority for the Financial Market. Article no. 68 of the same law provides for holding accountable the person responsible for the actual management of the company—namely, the person entrusted with direct duties related to the criminal act in question, even if it was committed in the name of or on behalf of the company. This model establishes a key principle: that the penalty should be borne by the person who personally commits the act, in line with the principle of personalization of punishment.
The Supreme Constitutional Court has affirmed this principle in its rulings, stating that penalties should only be imposed on those proven responsible for the offense and must be proportionate to its nature. In one of its landmark decisions, the court stated: “The basic rule in crime is that penalties apply solely to those convicted as responsible for the offense, and such penalties must balance their severity with the nature of the crime—meaning no person shall be held accountable except for their own actions, and no guilt shall be attributed except to its actual perpetrator.”
Consequently, the absence of an explicit provision in the Press and Media Regulation Law defining the nature of criminal liability for the actual operation of websites constitutes a violation of fundamental legal safeguards. The legislator should have established precise and clear criteria identifying the liable party, in accordance with established constitutional principles, to prevent ambiguity in enforcement.
3-Categories Subject to Licensing Requirements
Based on the provisions of the Law on the Regulation of the Press and Media and its executive regulations, including the definitions and regulatory classifications related to licensing rules and conditions, as well as the scope of penalties and stipulated exemptions, it is possible to identify three main categories of websites that fall within the scope of the law.
The first category includes websites operating in the field of journalism and media. Although the law itself does not provide an explicit definition for these sites, the licensing regulations introduced two main definitions. The first is a “news website,” which refers to a site specialized in providing news services and broadcasting real-time news or related content. The second is an “electronic newspaper,” defined in the text as any digital publication edited by syndicated journalists, issued under a unified name on a regular and periodic basis by an Egyptian natural or legal person—whether public or private—and in accordance with approved legal regulations. These websites, in addition to those affiliated with visual or audio media outlets, are subject to licensing controls issued by the Supreme Council for Media Regulation.
The second category pertains to advertising-oriented websites, which the law defines as those that provide “content promoting businesses, services, products, or individuals via the internet.” These websites are subject to the same licensing requirements from the Supreme Council for Media Regulation.
The third category consists of personal websites, which the licensing regulations define as sites created by individuals online to display their resumes, interests, ideas, or hobbies. These websites are explicitly exempt from licensing requirements under Article no. 1 of the law’s issuing provisions. However, the law grants the Council the authority to block such websites if they violate Article no. 19 of the Law on the Regulation of the Press and Media.
These three categories establish an essential condition for the offense of operating a website without a license: the website must fall under one of the legally mandated licensing categories, which are strictly limited to journalistic, media, and advertising websites. Although the definition of “advertising content” lacks precision and clarity—particularly given its potentially broad scope—a proper interpretation requires distinguishing between websites engaged in professional advertising activities on behalf of others or in e‑commerce, and those that may contain only incidental promotional content.
Consequently, websites that do not fall under these three categories are not subject to the criminalization stipulated in Article no. 6 of the law, and their administrators cannot be held accountable for operating an unlicensed website. The Supreme Council for Media Regulation expansion of legal compliance requirements to include websites of unions, associations, clubs, and non-media entities constitutes a departure from the law’s text and an overreach of its mandate—even if accompanied by published licensing forms.
Accordingly, investigative authorities should first verify the nature of the website’s activity before bringing charges, and should not rely solely on a technical opinion or report issued by the Supreme Council for Media Regulation regarding websites that do not fall within its jurisdiction. The Council’s authority is limited to media and advertising websites only, and any opinion it issues concerning other websites carries no legal weight. Such opinions are considered non‑binding and have no bearing on the legal course of the investigation, and cannot, on their own, serve as a basis for initiating criminal proceedings or bringing charges.
Fifth: Social Media Accounts Are Not Subject to Licensing Requirements
Article 1 of the Press and Media Regulation Law explicitly exempts personal accounts and websites from licensing. However, the absence of a precise and clear definition of the categories excluded from the law’s scope – as previously mentioned – has in some cases led to personal account holders facing criminal charges related to operating unlicensed digital accounts.
For example, in one case before the Economic Court in Cairo, the Public Prosecution classified the acts of publishing via a channel on the YouTube platform in a manner that raised questions about whether the channel was subject to licensing by the Supreme Council for Media Regulation. Accordingly, the Prosecution contacted the Supreme Council to request clarification on the legal status of the channel and its associated website. The Supreme Council for Media Regulation responded by stating that the URL in question and the YouTube channel created on the platform were not licensed by the Council.
The prosecution based its charges solely on the SCMR’s letter, which conflated the establishment of a website with the creation of a social media channel—a critical legal mischaracterization it failed to address. Despite this flawed foundation, the prosecution proceeded with charges. However, the Economic Court in Cairo concluded in its ruling that there was no acceptable conclusive evidence proving that the first defendant had established or operated the website in question, noting that another person, named Michael Milad, was the one managing the site, and that the Prosecution had neither charged him nor brought him to trial.
As for the YouTube channel, the court clarified that Article 6 of the Law on the Regulation of the Press and Media applies only to the establishment and operation of websites, not to personal accounts or channels on social media platforms. The court ruled that this type of account does not fall within the scope of regulation subject to the licensing requirements set out in the law and acquitted the defendant of the charges brought against her.
This ruling reflects a sound judicial understanding of the distinction between websites regulated by the law and personal accounts that do not fall within its scope. It also highlights an improper practice by the Supreme Council for Media Regulation, which has sought to expand its authority to cover personal accounts and channels—not only with respect to published content but also regarding the legality of their creation and operation—an expansion that lacks any legal basis.
In addition to lacking any legal basis, this expansion is practically impossible to implement, as it would be unfeasible to require all personal account holders to obtain licenses from the Supreme Council for Media Regulation. Nevertheless, the risk of selective enforcement remains, as certain accounts could be targeted while others are ignored—practices that may carry a discriminatory or retaliatory character, thereby undermining the principle of equality before the law and eroding procedural legitimacy.
Sixth: Consequences of Violating Licensing Regulations
The Law on the Regulation of the Press and Media devotes a separate section to the penalties applicable to media institutions. However, Article 6 of the law contains a specific penalty for the crime of operating a website without a license. Although our earlier analysis clarified that the categories required to obtain a license are limited to media and advertising websites, in practice there has been an expansive interpretation of Article 6 by investigative authorities and the Supreme Council for Media Regulation. This has resulted in charges being brought against websites that do not actually fall within this scope.
Article no. 105 of the law specifies the penalties for violating Article 6 as follows:
“Whoever violates the provisions of Articles (6, 41, 59, 67) of this law shall be punished with a fine of no less than one million Egyptian pounds and not exceeding three million pounds. In addition, the court shall order the closure [of the website] and confiscation of equipment, devices, and components used in committing the offense.”
It is clear from this that the legislator chose to impose an excessively severe financial penalty for the crime of operating a website without a license, making it one of the harshest financial penalties in the Law on the Regulation of the Press and Media. While most financial penalties stipulated in the law range between fifty thousand pounds and a maximum of one million pounds, the penalty for this crime carries a minimum of one million pounds and a maximum of three million pounds, without any logical justification proportionate to the nature of the offense.
The paradox becomes even more striking when comparing this to Article no. 104 of the law, which criminalizes intentional acts such as intercepting, disrupting, or interfering with radio/TV broadcasts – yet imposes the exact same financial penalty as operating an unlicensed website. This equivalence in penalties between a crime of an aggressive technical nature that interferes with public broadcasting and a purely regulatory offense related to licensing constitutes a serious breach of the principle of proportionality between the crime and the punishment.
In addition to the financial fine, Article no. 105 provides for supplementary penalties, including the closure and confiscation of the equipment, devices, and their components used in committing the crime. Like the principal penalty, these supplementary penalties suffer from excessiveness and disproportionality, as well as ambiguity regarding their applicability to individuals as opposed to legal entities, thereby creating the potential for arbitrary enforcement.
Consequently, the penalty prescribed for the offense of operating an unlicensed website – both in its financial and supplementary aspects – reveals a clear flaw in the punitive structure of the law. This necessitates legislative review that accounts for the nature of the offense, the categories subject to the law’s provisions, and the principle of proportionality as a fundamental pillar of criminal justice.
1-Penalties under the Press and Media Regulation Law (Closure and Confiscation)
In addition to the previously noted unjustified severity of financial penalties for operating an unlicensed website, Article no. 105 of the Press and Media Regulation Law demonstrates further excess by imposing multiple penalties for the same offense. The article mandates that courts, upon conviction, must apply a supplementary penalty of closure and confiscation of all equipment, devices, and components used in committing the violation. While such a penalty might be justifiable in cases of repeat offenses, its automatic application to first-time violations—merely for establishing a website without a license—is illogical, given its permanent and irreversible consequences. It is unreasonable to impose a penalty of this severity for a regulatory violation that does not constitute a serious crime or threat to public security.
The punitive philosophy adopted by the legislator in this context – which treats a simple regulatory violation as a crime warranting both primary and supplementary severe penalties – suggests that the criminalized act involves significant danger, a characterization incompatible with its actual nature. By comparison, the Penal Code prescribes supplementary penalties such as the dissolution of associations, bodies, or groups aiming to undermine the state’s system, and the confiscation of instruments used in committing the crime—offenses that are, by their nature, serious and directly threaten the internal security of the state.1
As for the offense of operating an unlicensed website, it remains at its core an administrative violation relating to non-compliance with regulatory procedures, without involving elements of serious harm or intentional aggressive action. Were it not for the statutory financial penalty of up to three million Egyptian pounds, it would be more appropriate to classify it as an administrative offense in accordance with the severity standard adopted in criminal policy.
In addition, Article no. 105 presents a serious legal issue where the supplementary penalty of closure effectively makes the legality of the legal entity itself contingent upon obtaining a license from the Supreme Council for Media Regulation. In the event of a conviction, this results in the dissolution of the legal status of the entity operating the website, regardless of its nature or primary activity.
This problem is exacerbated by the practices of the Supreme Council for Media Regulation, which has expanded the scope of entities subject to licensing requirements beyond those explicitly mentioned in the law—such as unions, associations, and clubs. This opens the door to a constant threat of closure and confiscation for these entities, whether in cases of failing to obtain a license, or if a license is revoked or not renewed.
This situation undermines the principle of legal certainty, exposes a wide range of institutions operating in Egypt to unjustified legal risks, and erodes the constitutional safeguards related to freedom of association and lawful ownership. Therefore, Article no. 105, in its current form, calls for urgent legislative review to clearly define its scope of application and to provide the necessary legal protection for entities that do not, in the first place, fall within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Council for Media Regulation.
2- Website Operation between Freedom of Establishment and Harsh Penalties
The Egyptian legislator tends, in many laws, to impose excessively severe penalties, whether through the expansion of custodial sentences or the imposition of heavy financial fines. This approach is traditionally justified by the desire to achieve general deterrence, under the claim that the purpose of punishment is to prevent the commission of the crime rather than to be harsh for its own sake. However, this justification loses its validity when the legislator overlooks the differences in the nature of offenses and the varying degrees of their seriousness, and thus the need for distinct and graduated punitive approaches.
In the case of the Press and Media Regulation Law, the legislator demonstrably failed to uphold a fundamental criterion relating to the nature and gravity of the criminalized acts. As a regulatory law by nature, its primary aim is to establish procedural rules that ensure the enforcement of constitutional rights, not to create a repressive punitive regime. Therefore, balancing the freedom to establish media outlets and newspapers on the one hand, and the need to respect legal requirements on the other, requires that penalties be administrative and regulatory in nature, proportionate to the violation committed.
However, in circumventing constitutional safeguards, the legislator replaced custodial sentences with excessively severe financial fines, which can have an impact equal to—or even harsher than—actual imprisonment, especially as they essentially target a constitutional right related to freedom of expression and the establishment of media outlets. In such a context, exorbitant fines become, in effect, a disguised means of confiscating this right.
The situation grows more problematic when considering that the fines imposed under Article no. 105 of the Press and Media Regulation Law – reaching up to 3 million EGP – bear no connection to actual harm caused to specific individuals or entities. These penalties lack restorative or compensatory justification, as they are directly transferred to state coffers rather than allocated to victims or corrective measures.
Does the mere establishment of a website—an essentially procedural or administrative act—truly warrant such a severe punitive sanction? Or is the real objective of the penalty not deterrence, but rather prevention: narrowing the digital public sphere and ensuring that expression remains subject to control?
This leads us to an inescapable conclusion: the penalties imposed for violating licensing requirements to create a website are inherently unreasonable. By this, it is meant that when a penalty is excessively severe, imposed for acts that do not warrant criminalization, or is clearly disproportionate to the seriousness of the act in question, it loses its legitimacy and becomes an infringement on personal freedom.
This establishes three fundamental criteria for drafting legislative penalties:
- Proportionality between the nature of the criminalized act and its prescribed punishment.
- Genuine societal necessity justifying penalty severity.
- Graduated sanctions, avoiding maximal penalties for initial violations.
Applying these standards to Article no. 105 of the Press and Media Regulation Law reveals its fundamental flaws. It is unreasonable for penalties to begin with a fine of no less than one million Egyptian pounds for a mere procedural violation related to licensing. The law fails to provide reasonable alternatives such as granting a grace period to rectify the situation or even issuing an administrative warning before imposing penalties. Furthermore, the article establishes no clear connection between the consequences of the procedural violation (i.e., operating a website without a license) and the severity of the prescribed punishment.
This absence of proportionality and gradual escalation, coupled with the excessive criminalization without clear societal necessity, transforms the prescribed penalties into instruments of intimidation rather than regulation. It undermines citizens’ trust in the rule of law and jeopardizes the constitutional legitimacy of media regulation policies in the digital sphere.
Seventh: Grounds for the Unconstitutionality of the Crime of Operating an unlicensed Website
The crime of operating a website without a license, as stipulated in Article no. 6 of the law regulating the Press and Media, contains multiple aspects that give rise to suspicions of unconstitutionality with respect to its criminalization. Likewise, Article no. 105 of the law contains aspects that raise doubts about its constitutionality in relation to the criminal penalty prescribed for this offense.
1-Unconstitutionality of Penalties of Closure, Confiscation, Suspension, and Blocking
The offense of operating a website without a license, as set out in Article 6 of the law regulating the press and media, contains multiple aspects that raise doubts about its constitutionality with respect to the criminalized act itself. Likewise, Article 105 of the law—which prescribes the criminal penalty for this offense—raises similar doubts, both in terms of the nature of the penalty and the extent of its constitutional legitimacy.
The first paragraph of Article no. 71 of the Egyptian Constitution stipulates: “No censorship shall be imposed on Egyptian newspapers and media outlets in any form, nor shall they be subject to confiscation, suspension, or shutdown.” This provision establishes the constitutional protection of the freedom of the press, printing, and publishing in all their means and forms, and prohibits any form of abuse, intimidation, or restriction on the freedom of publication by the executive authority or any other body.
The Constitution provides a single exception in the second paragraph of the same article, allowing for limited censorship during times of war or general mobilization. However, this exception does not extend to confiscation, suspension, closure, or blocking, which the constitutional text prohibits absolutely—whether under normal or exceptional circumstances, and whether imposed as a criminal penalty or by administrative decision.
Despite the clarity of this prohibition, the Press and Media Regulation Law mandates both shutdown and confiscation of equipment and devices used in committing the offense as mandatory supplementary penalties for the crime of operating a website without a license. The legislator even went so far as to combine the severe financial fine with these supplementary penalties of closure and confiscation, without granting the court any discretionary power in their imposition. This constitutes a clear encroachment on the constitutional protection of press freedom.
This legislative approach also contradicts the established jurisprudence of Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court, which has consistently ruled that press freedom is constitutionally guaranteed and cannot be subject to arbitrary restrictions or interference, as it constitutes a fundamental pillar of free societal dialogue. In one of its rulings, the Supreme Constitutional Court stated:
“Whereas the Constitution, under Article no. 65, guarantees freedom of opinion and the right to expression, and under Articles no. 70 and 71 preserves the freedom of the press, prohibiting its censorship—except as an exception in times of war or general mobilization—and prohibiting its confiscation, suspension, or closure, thereby, as a general rule, preventing interference in its affairs or burdening it with restrictions that turn back its message or weaken it by diminishing its role in building and developing society. The Constitution always seeks to enshrine essential values, foremost among them ensuring that dialogue replaces oppression and tyranny, serving as a window through which citizens may access truths that must not be concealed from them, and as a gateway to deepening their knowledge, which must not be obscured or distorted. Evaluating such knowledge must be an objective process that defines for each authority the scope of its rights under the Constitution, such that its exercise affirms its representative character and paves the way for greater freedoms with diverse forms and orientations. Indeed, the press guarantees the citizen an active role, particularly by offering opportunities through which he may express the opinions he believes in—individual self-expression—and through which he may achieve self-realization. Yet this right and that freedom, being of one fabric, are not immune from legislative regulation.”
The same ground for unconstitutionality is repeated in Article no. 19 of the law, which grants the Supreme Council for Media Regulation administrative authority to suspend or block a website, blog, or personal account if its content is deemed to contain false news, or an incitement to break the law, violence, hatred, discrimination, defamation, insult, or contempt of religions.
Although some of these acts may indeed constitute actual crimes warranting accountability, granting an administrative body the authority to impose a penalty of such profound effect—such as blocking—without going through the required judicial procedures constitutes a clear violation of the principle of judicial independence and the principle of procedural legality. It also conflicts with the constitutional prohibition in Article no. 71 regarding closure or blocking.
Combining the regulatory criminalization of the offense of operating a website without a license with the imposition of criminal and/or administrative penalties of a repressive nature—such as closure, confiscation, or blocking—contradicts the explicit constitutional provisions and the well‑established principles in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Constitutional Court. It undermines freedom of the press and expression, transforming the law from a tool for regulating freedoms into an instrument for suppressing them. This constitutes a strong basis for challenging the constitutionality of these two articles, should a litigant establish a direct personal interest.
2-Unconstitutionality Due to Ambiguity in Defining the Scope of Criminal Liability
Given the lack of clarity regarding the entities subject to the provisions of the Press and Media Regulation Law —stemming from the Supreme Council for Media Regulation’s expansive application of licensing requirements to entities and bodies not explicitly or implicitly mentioned in the text of the law, particularly Articles no. 6 and 105— a fundamental question arises regarding the intended meaning of the term “administration/operation” in the context of the crime of operating an unlicensed website.
While Article no. 6 of the law treats the terms “operation” and “establishment” as equivalent—without providing a precise definition for either—the term “operation” carries particular significance, as it determines the scope of criminal liability. However, the legislator did not clearly specify whether “operation” refers to:
- The responsibility of the legal entity (juridical person) for the general supervision of the website,
- Or the criminal liability of the natural person engaged in the website’s day‑to‑day technical management “actual administration”.
- Or a joint liability shared between the two.
This ambiguity leads to serious consequences in determining the actual criminally liable party and undermines a fundamental principle of criminal justice.
If we assume that the legislator intended “operation” to mean the responsibility of the legal entity, then applying criminal penalties—particularly supplementary penalties such as closure and confiscation—becomes practically inconceivable if there is no natural person who can be held accountable.
If, however, the intended meaning refers to actual/functional management, proving such liability would require meeting substantive conditions tied to direct and continuous engagement in the criminalized act—a matter the law fails to regulate with precision.
This ambiguity explicitly contradicts the principles established by the Supreme Constitutional Court regarding the necessity of clarity in penal provisions. As articulated in one of its rulings:
“The fundamental principle in criminal provisions is that they should be drafted within narrow limits, defining the acts criminalized by the legislator and specifying their nature, to ensure that any ambiguity does not become a pretext for undermining rights guaranteed by the Constitution to citizens […] Likewise, the principle in criminal law is that no one bears the penalty of a crime except the person convicted as responsible for it, and such penalty must be proportionate in severity to the nature of the offense in question.”
Accordingly, the absence of a clear legislative definition of the term ‘management’ undermines the principle of personalization of punishment stipulated in Article no. 66 of the Constitution, and leads to an expansion of the scope of criminalization without safeguards, which constitutes a serious presumption of the unconstitutionality of the provision.
This legislative defect not only undermines the guarantees afforded to defendants, but also opens the door to selective practices or broad interpretations by law enforcement and investigative authorities, and undermines the principle of criminal legality as one of the pillars of the rule of law.
3-Unconstitutionality of Penalties Due to Their Disproportion with the Criminal Conduct
The principle of proportionality between the crime and the penalty is one of the fundamental pillars of criminal justice, guaranteed by modern constitutions — including the Egyptian Constitution — as an application of the principles of criminal legality and personalization of punishment. These principles require that the prescribed penalty be proportionate to the gravity of the criminal act, in terms of its nature, its outcome, and its degree of social danger, without excessiveness or arbitrariness.
In light of this, the penalties prescribed for the offense of operating a website without a license, as set out in Articles no. 6 and 105 of the law regulating the press and media, raise serious concerns regarding proportionality and reasonableness, as they far exceed the scope of the criminalized conduct, and indeed strip the principle of freedom of the press of its substance.
The Supreme Constitutional Court has established a consistent principle that the legitimacy of any penalty—whether criminal, civil, or disciplinary—is contingent upon its proportionality to the acts criminalized by the legislature. In one of its rulings, the Court stated:
“The basic principle regarding punishment is its reasonableness. The more the criminal sanction is abhorrent or excessively harsh, or connected to acts that do not warrant criminalization, or is manifestly inconsistent with the limits within which it would be proportionate to the seriousness of the acts criminalized by the legislature, the more it loses its justification for existence and becomes an arbitrary restriction on personal freedom.”
However, the Press and Media Regulation Law stipulates three severe penalties for a single offense: a financial fine of no less than one million pounds and no more than three million pounds, a shutdown penalty, and a confiscation penalty. These three penalties are imposed collectively by force of law, without granting the judge discretionary power to assess their appropriateness or substitute them.
Each of these penalties is inherently disproportionate to the nature of the offense – which remains, at its core, a regulatory violation – while their collective application constitutes a grave violation of the principle of proportionality. In essence, this represents a confiscation of the right to press and publishing freedom, resulting in direct and unlawful restrictions on freedom of expression.
As for the shutdown and confiscation penalties, they not only violate Article no. 71 of the Constitution, which prohibits the closure, confiscation, or suspension of media outlets, but also constitute permanent and radical sanctions whose effects cannot be remedied—particularly when imposed on a legally established entity operating on a regular basis.
As for the financial penalty, its maximum limit ranks among the highest fines stipulated in Egyptian media-related legislation—despite the absence of objective justifications for such excessive severity, particularly since the criminalized act does not entail actual harm or imminent danger, but rather relates to a breach of administrative regulations.
In this context, the three penalties—whether imposed individually or collectively—become closer to instruments of repression rather than legitimate means of regulating the profession. Their purpose thus shifts from protecting public order to restricting media pluralism and reducing spaces for expression.
Accordingly, the continued enforcement of these punitive provisions in their current form poses a threat to the right to freedom of the media and expression, and undermines the foundations of constitutional criminal justice. This necessitates urgent legislative intervention to reassess the prescribed penalties and ensure their alignment with constitutional principles and the requirements of the public interest.
Conclusion
The study reveals the extent of the contradictions and excesses inherent in the legal and regulatory framework governing the licensing and management of websites in Egypt, particularly as set out in Articles 6 and 105 of the Press and Media Regulation Law. Although the primary purpose of regulatory laws is to safeguard the exercise of constitutional rights—chief among them freedom of expression and the establishment of media outlets—the vague wording of the provisions, the conflation of the concepts of “establishment” and “operation,” and the expansion of licensing requirements to include entities not expressly covered by the law, have led to a state of legal ambiguity and inconsistency in application.
The analysis reveals that the penalties prescribed for operating an unlicensed website—whether primary (fines) or supplementary (shutdown and confiscation)— are inconsistent with established constitutional principles, foremost among them the principles of legality and the personalization of punishment, as well as the principle of proportionality between the act and the penalty. Moreover, they are in clear violation of Article no. 71 of the Constitution, which imposes an absolute prohibition on the confiscation, suspension, or closure of media outlets.
Maintaining these provisions in their current form, along with the accompanying administrative practices, would turn the law from a tool for regulating freedoms into a tool for restricting them, and from a safeguard for press freedom into a means of confiscation and exclusion—particularly in the absence of clear criteria for defining “operation” or precisely identifying the categories required to obtain a license. Moreover, the near-automatic imposition of severe penalties for non-substantive regulatory violations conflicts with the fundamental principles of criminal justice and raises suspicions of abuse in criminalization and punishment.
Accordingly, the study recommends revising the aforementioned legal provisions—both in terms of their definitions/concepts and prescribed penalties—to ensure the legislature’s compliance with constitutional principles and provide genuine protection for press and expression freedoms, without compromising the requirements of sound regulation. It also calls for limiting the powers of the Supreme Council for Media Regulation and preventing it from expanding beyond the scope of the law, while stressing the need to establish an independent mechanism to review its decisions and ensure they are subject to effective judicial oversight.
Thus, the need for reform is not limited to legal drafting but also encompasses administrative practice, as well as approaches to judicial interpretation and understanding, in order to protect the digital space as a vital arena for expression and to safeguard constitutional rights against the increasing restrictive tendencies.
1 Article 98(h) of Penal Code No. 58 of 1937, as amended in 2021 by Law No. 141, provides:
“In the cases set forth in Articles 98(a), 98(a) bis, and 98(c), the court shall order the dissolution of the associations, bodies, organizations, groups, or branches mentioned and the closure of their premises, as well as the confiscation of funds, goods, equipment, documents, and anything else that may have been used in committing the crime or prepared for such use, or that may be found in the places designated for the meetings of members of such associations, bodies, organizations, groups, or branches. The court shall also order the confiscation of any funds derived from the crime, or appearing to be part of the convicted person’s assets, if there is evidence leading to the conclusion that such funds are, in fact, allocated for expenditure on the aforementioned associations, bodies, organizations, groups, or branches.”