Introduction

Egypt’s legislative and judicial environment has witnessed significant developments in the regulation of digital content, as relevant legal frameworks have been reshaped through new mechanisms, most notably “blocking websites” as a legal tool to restrict access to certain content or services.

Blocking began as an exceptional security and judicial measure and gradually became more entrenched, becoming one of the sanctions provided for in several modern Egyptian laws, whether as a precautionary measure or as an administrative or criminal penalty.

The provisions that authorize content blocking raise legal and constitutional concerns, particularly in light of the 2014 Constitution’s prohibition on prior censorship of the media.

The judiciary, particularly the State Council’s courts, played a pivotal role in establishing the foundational rules that paved the way for the use of blocking as a legal tool. This was achieved through expansive interpretations of the Telecommunications Regulation Law, relying on broad concepts such as “social national security.”

One of the earliest applications of this approach emerged in the case of the “film offensive to the Prophet,” adjudicated by the Administrative Judiciary Court in 2012. The ruling ultimately mandated the blocking of YouTube and numerous related links, based on extensive interpretations of relevant legal provisions.

These judicial precedents paved the way for the legislature to subsequently institutionalize blocking practices through specialized legislation, such as the Anti-Terrorism Law, which for the first time established explicit legal authority for blocking within an exceptional framework. The Anti-Cyber and Information Technology Crimes Law (Cybercrime Law) and the Media and Press Regulation Law followed this.

Within this expanding legislative landscape, blocking has assumed various forms. These include measures justified on national security grounds under the Anti-Terrorism Law, as well as preventive measures, administrative penalties, or criminal sanctions authorized under laws such as the Media Regulation Law, the Cybercrime Law, and the Telecommunications Law.

Blocking powers were conferred upon a wide range of authorities, including the Public Prosecution, law enforcement bodies, and the Supreme Council for Media Regulation, thereby distributing and expanding this competence in an unprecedented manner.

These practices became particularly prominent starting in 2017, when authorities began implementing large-scale blocking operations—often without a clear legal basis or publicly disclosed decisions. This raises fundamental questions regarding the constitutionality of such measures, especially given the absence of effective mechanisms to challenge or review these decisions in certain cases.

In 2022, the Court of Cassation issued a ruling on an appeal against the Tanta Economic Court of Appeal’s decision in a commercial and technical dispute between a company holding a trademark and individuals who created counterfeit websites imitating its name and brand. This ruling represented a novel interpretation in countering attempts to broadly apply website blocking rules, as the court affirmed the impermissibility of expanding the application of these rules beyond the framework explicitly stipulated by law.

The ruling holds particular importance as it establishes clear controls to determine the competent authorities responsible for issuing and implementing website blocking orders, distinguishing between the roles of the Ministry of Interior and the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority in this process on one hand, while also implicitly highlighting the affirmation of an established principle in Egyptian judicial jurisprudence: the prohibition of analogy or expansive interpretation in the application of laws with penal/criminal character.

Accordingly, this paper seeks to examine the ruling with a particular focus on the aspects concerning the determination of jurisdiction in issuing and executing electronic blocking orders. It will further highlight the legal principles established by the Court, especially those pertaining to the interpretation of Article no. 7 of the Anti-Cybercrime Law, as well as the distinction drawn between the competences of the Minister of Interior on the one hand, and the National Telecom Regulatory Authority on the other.

The Legislative Context of Website Blocking in Egypt

To clarify the background of the ruling, it is essential to understand the legislative framework governing the issue of website blocking in Egyptian law. The enactment of Anti-Cybercrime Law No. 175 of 2018 marked the first explicit, non-exceptional legal regulation of website blocking procedures on the internet in Egypt.

Article no. 7 of this law established a specific mechanism for issuing and executing orders to block websites that broadcast content constituting serious cybercrimes, such as crimes against national security or those endangering the country’s security and economy. According to this article, the competent investigative authority has the right to issue an order to block one or more websites if evidence exists that the published content constitutes a crime stipulated by law and threatens national security or the economy. The investigative authority must then submit this order to the competent criminal court within 24 hours, accompanied by a memorandum justifying the blocking. The court must then decide whether to uphold or reject the order within 72 hours of its submission.

The Article also established specific controls for urgent cases requiring immediate action before a judicial decision is issued. In situations of urgency where there is an imminent threat or impending harm, the article authorizes competent investigation and law enforcement authorities to immediately notify the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (NTRA). The NTRA, in turn, notifies the service provider to temporarily block the website or content in question. The service provider is obligated to execute the notification immediately upon receipt.

Subsequently, the law enforcement authority must draw up an official report documenting the measures taken within forty-eight hours and submit it to the competent investigative authority. The investigative authority, in turn, must submit the report to the court to decide whether to uphold the temporary blocking measure or to revoke it within a specified timeframe.

If the report is not submitted within the prescribed timeframe, the temporary blocking order shall be deemed null and void. Additionally, the law authorizes the competent court, during the consideration of the criminal case or upon the request of the investigative authority, the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority, or concerned parties, to order the termination or modification of the scope of the blocking decision.

In all cases, the blocking order lapses if a decision is issued that there are no grounds for initiating criminal proceedings or if a final judgment of acquittal is rendered.

A reading of Article no. 7 reveals that the Egyptian legislator has outlined a specific approach to website blocking, linking the issuance of a blocking order to the existence of a judicial investigation and a reasoned judicial order. The law further entrusted the implementation of blocking measures to the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (NTRA), in coordination with internet service providers. In other words, the law did not confer upon law enforcement bodies or administrative authorities the unilateral power to impose blocking measures without judicial oversight, except within the narrow confines of urgent cases and only on a temporary basis pending the issuance of a judicial ruling.

Facts of the Case and the Appealed Judgment

The Court of Cassation’s ruling arose in the context of a commercial and technological dispute involving practices of unfair competition over the internet. The facts began when two individuals created two websites on the internet, through which they misappropriated the name and trademarks of a commercial company, thereby misleading consumers into believing that these websites were affiliated with the original company.

The company owning the original name and trademark filed a lawsuit before the competent economic court—the Tanta Economic Court—against both the operators of the counterfeit websites and certain official entities. The lawsuit included the following requests:

First: compelling the defendants to block the two websites under dispute and refrain from creating any other websites that unlawfully exploit their trademarks.

Second: To hold them jointly liable to pay material and moral compensation of one million Egyptian pounds for the damages incurred by the company.

Third: To publish a summary of the judgment in one of the daily newspapers at their expense.

Fourth: To oblige the competent administrative authorities to register the two phone numbers used in the unlawful activity under the name of the original company, in order to prevent their misuse.

During the proceedings, the company brought in new defendants in their official capacities (including the Minister of Interior, the Director of the General Department of Information Technology at the Ministry of Interior, the Chairman of the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority, among others), requesting that they be compelled to implement the court’s judgment with respect to blocking the infringing websites and to take the necessary measures to prevent such infringement.

Following a series of procedures before the Economic Court, including the appointment of a technical expert who confirmed the similarity and infringement of the company’s trademark and concluded the existence of unfair competition by the two counterfeit websites, the Tanta Economic Court of Appeal issued its ruling on the merits on March 14, 2021. The judgment obligated the first appellant (in his capacity as the Minister of Interior) to block the two counterfeit websites identified in the expert’s report from the internet while dismissing the remainder of the claims.

Thus, the court of first instance fulfilled only the part of the claim related to electronic blocking and placed the burden of its implementation on the Ministry of the Interior, represented by its Minister, while rejecting the claims for compensation, publication, and others.

This ruling raised a fundamental legal question regarding the validity of tasking the Minister of the Interior with implementing the blocking of websites, particularly in light of the fact that the Anti-Cybercrime Law explicitly assigns this responsibility to the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority. Subsequently, the Minister of the Interior (in his official capacity) and the Director of the General Department of Information Technology appealed this ruling through a cassation appeal before the Court of Cassation.

The Public Prosecution, as an intervening party, argued that the appeal was improperly directed against the Director of the Information Technology Department, given his lack of independent legal capacity (since the Minister of Interior is the legal representative of the Ministry and all its departments by virtue of the law). The Court of Cassation upheld this argument, rejecting the appeal filed by the General Department of Information Technology as inadmissible due to lack of legal standing, ruling that the legal personality and capacity for litigation reside solely with the Minister himself on behalf of all the Ministry’s departments.

The principal substantive ground of the appeal centered on the judgment’s violation of the law and its error in application. The judgment obliged the Minister of Interior to block the disputed websites, despite his lack of legal authority to carry out blocking measures, given that competence is vested by law in the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority.

The Minister of the Interior argued that all internet service providers fall under the supervision of the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (NTRA) pursuant to its establishing law. Furthermore, under Article no. 7 of the Anti-Cybercrime Law, the NTRA is the sole authority responsible for notifying service providers of websites blocking, not enwebsiteithin the Ministry of the Interior.

The appellant further asserted that the issue of legal capacity in implementing blocking orders pertains to public policy and may be raised at any stage of the litigation. He contended that the Economic Court’s ruling erred by disregarding the plea challenging the Minister of the Interior’s lack of capacity in this matter.

It is worth noting that the Public Prosecution endorsed this legal opinion and submitted a memorandum in the appeal recommending the annulment of the challenged judgment for violating the correct application of the law.

Determining the Competent Authorities to Issue and Enforce Website Blocking

In its ruling, the court of cassation focused on a clear determination of the legal jurisdiction with respect to the issuance and enforcement of blocking orders, in accordance with the provisions of Law No. 175 of 2018 and the Telecommunications Regulation Law No. 10 of 2003. From the operative part of the judgment and its reasoning, the following becomes evident:

• Authority Issuing the Blocking Order: The body legally empowered to issue the initial order to block a website is the competent investigative authority — either the Public Prosecution or the Investigating Judge, as the case may be — once evidence is established of a crime committed through the website that poses a threat to national security or the country’s economy. This investigative order remains temporary and is conditional upon being submitted to the competent criminal court within 24 hours for either confirmation or annulment.
• Authority for Approving and Enforcing the Blocking Order: The competent criminal court (sitting in chambers) is the body that grants final judicial approval on whether to maintain the website’s blocking or not, within 72 hours of the order being submitted to it. In the event of judicial approval, the decision is directed to the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (NTRA), which undertakes the technical enforcement of the blocking order by notifying Internet service providers to implement it immediately. In other words, the NTRA serves as the executive intermediary through which court-issued blocking orders are conveyed to service providers, given that it is the body authorized to grant licenses for operating telecommunications networks in Egypt and empowered to monitor the compliance of licensed companies with the terms of their licenses. The Court of Cassation clarified this role by stating that the legislature regarded the NTRA as ‘an intermediary between the investigative and judicial authorities on the one hand, and information technology service providers on the other,’ by virtue of its access to providers’ data and its ability to promptly notify them of blocking decisions issued against them.
• Role of the Ministry of Interior’s Agencies (Investigation and Enforcement): The role of the Ministry of Interior’s agencies responsible for combating cybercrimes — such as the General Department for Information Technology — is limited to gathering evidence and conducting seizures, and does not extend to the enforcement of website blocking orders. The Court of Cassation stressed that the Ministry of Interior has no jurisdiction over executing electronic blocking, as it is not the authority mandated to notify Internet companies or cut off service. Rather, its duty is confined to tracking the crime and collecting evidence against those who created the unlawful website. This is further confirmed by Telecommunications Regulation Law No. 10 of 2003, which assigned those functions exclusively to the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (NTRA).
• Blocking Procedure in Cases of Urgency: Even in exceptional circumstances where the law allows enforcement agencies to intervene urgently (as per Paragraph no. 2 of Article no. 7), the role of these agencies is limited to notifying the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (NTRA) to take immediate temporary action. This does not grant them independent authority to execute blocking measures themselves. The Court of Cassation affirmed that the provision in Paragraph no. 2 of Article no. 7, which permits investigative and enforcement agencies to notify the NTRA to block a website in urgent cases, does not alter the fact that these agencies’ primary function remains limited to gathering evidence and investigating crimes as judicial enforcement bodies. In other words, even urgent blocking is carried out technically through the NTRA.

Based on the foregoing, the Court of Cassation resolved the dispute over the authority competent to enforce blocking orders in favor of the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (NTRA) alone, stripping the Ministry of Interior of any capacity or jurisdiction in this regard. This is made clear in its ruling that obligating the Minister of Interior to block a website constitutes a violation of the law and a misapplication thereof, since the power to block falls outside his legal authority. This precise delineation of jurisdiction ensures that nobody exceeds its legally defined role, and preserves the logical sequence: judicial investigation, then judicial decision, followed by technical enforcement through the competent authority.

The Legal Principles Established by the Court of Cassation

In this context, the Court of Cassation, through this ruling, has established several key legal principles that guide the understanding and application of the provisions of the Anti-Cybercrime Law in the future. The most prominent of these principles can be summarized as follows:

1. Exclusive Jurisdiction of the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (NTRA) to Enforce Blocking Orders, and the Absence of a Technical Role for the Ministry of Interior in Executing Such Orders.

The Court decisively ruled that the enforcement of website blocking orders falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (NTRA) under the governing laws (Telecommunications Regulation Law No. 10 of 2003 and Cybercrime Law No. 175 of 2018).

The NTRA possesses the technical expertise and the legal connection with Internet service providers, and it enjoys an independent status that enables it to implement blocking decisions and notify service providers accordingly. Therefore, no other administrative body may intervene directly in blocking a website without going through the NTRA.

The Court also affirmed that the Minister of Interior and his agencies do not have the authority to issue or enforce website blocking orders, except within the limits permitted by law for investigative and evidentiary roles. The Court clarified that the Ministry of Interior lacks any legal basis to communicate with Internet service providers or to block a website directly, as it has no legal personality in this regard, and is instead subordinate to the Public Prosecution in investigative procedures. Consequently, any judicial ruling obligating the Minister of Interior to block a website is legally flawed, as it entails assigning duties to a body that is not competent.

2. The Impermissibility of Broadly Interpreting Article 7 of the Anti-Cybercrime Law.

The Court of Cassation established a consistent approach in interpreting Article 7 of Law No. 175 of 2018, adhering to a strict literal interpretation of the penal and procedural provisions without expansion. Article no. 7 clearly specifies who is the ‘competent authority’ to issue a blocking order (the investigative authority with judicial authorization) and who is responsible for its enforcement (the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority), and no other categories may be added beyond what the text provides.

This is consistent with the general principle in interpreting criminal and procedural laws that any exceptional authority affecting rights (such as blocking a website, which impacts freedom of communication and information) must be interpreted as narrowly as possible and strictly according to what is explicitly stated in the legislation. This principle was reflected in the Court’s rejection of granting any additional role to the Ministry of Interior in the blocking process, even though some might argue that, given its security responsibilities, the Ministry could be concerned with this matter. The Court rejected such an expansion and adhered strictly to the limits set by the legal text.

The ruling implicitly emphasized the primacy of the rule of law and the subjection of all to judicial oversight in matters of online content blocking. Even law enforcement bodies, such as police authorities, when initiating temporary blocking in urgent cases through the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority, remain under strict supervision by the Public Prosecution and the court within very short timeframes. This reflects the Court’s understanding of the importance of ensuring that blocking measures do not become an arbitrary tool of the executive branch, but always remain within the framework of procedural legality.

The Court also affirmed that raising the objection of lack of jurisdiction or absence of legal capacity in such matters is considered a matter of public order and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, including for the first time before the Court of Cassation. This serves to protect the principle of legality and to ensure that all authorities adhere to the limits of their legally defined powers.

3. Protecting Intellectual Property Rights and Fair Competition without Procedural Overreach

Although the original dispute concerned unfair competition and trademark infringement through a fraudulent website, the Court of Cassation was careful to balance the protection of economic and civil rights with the preservation of procedural safeguards. The Court recognized that creating a website that impersonates a registered company constitutes a crime warranting blocking and prohibition to protect the rights holder. At the same time, however, it rejected achieving this protection through an unlawful procedure (i.e., instructing an authority not competent to enforce the block)

Concerns Regarding Blocking Procedures and the Impact of the Court of Cassation’s Ruling

The recent ruling of the Court of Cassation represents an important milestone in reopening the discussion on the permissible limits of interpretation in criminal and procedural laws, particularly concerning website blocking procedures. The Court affirmed a well-established principle in both the Egyptian legal and doctrinal systems: that expansive interpretation or analogy is not permitted in interpreting provisions of a penal nature, since these rules are designed to regulate procedures that affect fundamental rights and freedoms, and therefore must be interpreted as narrowly as possible.

This principle gains particular significance in the field of website blocking, given its potential impact on freedom of expression and the dissemination of information—rights protected by the Constitution and which may only be restricted under strict conditions. Accordingly, the Court of Cassation’s ruling closes the door on attempts to grant powers not explicitly provided for in the law, whether to executive or administrative bodies.

The Court’s conclusion is supported by the established jurisprudence of the Egyptian Court of Cassation permitting analogy in favor of the defendant. On the other hand, analogy may be applied in criminal procedure law with respect to rules that guarantee individual freedom, based on the principle that the individual is presumed to enjoy liberty and that the defendant is presumed innocent, which necessitates reinforcing all safeguards of personal freedom. This differs from procedural rules affecting liberty, which are provided only as exceptions¹.

Conclusion

The ruling of the Court of Cassation under review cannot be treated as the final solution to all issues related to website blocking or the regulation of intervention in the digital space. At its core, it represents an important judicial step that reaffirms fundamental principles in the allocation of competencies and the regulation of procedures. It serves as a reminder that the protection of rights and freedoms can only be achieved by respecting legal texts and interpreting them as narrowly as possible when they impose restrictions on these rights.

The significance of this ruling lies in its clear marking of the interaction between law and the digital domain in Egypt. It limits broad interpretations that might grant powers not explicitly provided for by law and reiterates that any intervention in this domain must be carried out through the competent authorities, following the procedures set by the legislature, and under judicial supervision. At the same time, however, the ruling remains part of a broader landscape that continues to undergo rapid changes due to technological development and the increasing overlap between the security, economic, and political dimensions of the Internet.

From this perspective, the ruling serves as a starting point upon which a more coherent judicial and legislative understanding of digital rights protection can be built. Nevertheless, it remains the legislature’s responsibility to review existing legal frameworks to ensure greater clarity and consistency in limiting or abolishing blocking powers, reflecting a stance against such practices. The executive authority also bears the duty to exercise these powers to the narrowest extent possible, while providing transparent and effective mechanisms for appeal and review.

The true value of this ruling stems from its role in opening a broader space for reviewing policies and practices related to digital space management. It contributes to reinforcing the idea that protecting security and the public interest should not come at the expense of fundamental rights and freedoms, but must be carried out within a legal framework that balances these intertwined interests and remains subject to continuous oversight.

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1 Dr. Fathi Sorour, Constitutional Protection of Rights and Freedoms, Shorouk Publishing, 2000 edition, p. 455 and following.